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Abstract: We present a secure communication system constructed using pairs of nonlinear 
photonic physical unclonable functions (PUFs) that harness physical chaos in integrated 
silicon micro-cavities. Compared to a large, electronically stored one-time pad, our method 
provisions large amounts of information within the intrinsically complex nanostructure of the 
micro-cavities. By probing a micro-cavity with a rapid sequence of spectrally-encoded 
ultrafast optical pulses and measuring the lightwave responses, we experimentally 
demonstrate the ability to extract 2.4 Gb of key material from a single micro-cavity device. 
Subsequently, in a secure communications experiment with pairs of devices, we achieve bit 
error rates below 10-5 at code rates of up to 0.1. The PUFs’ responses are never transmitted 
over the channel or stored in digital memory, thus enhancing security of the system. 
Additionally, the micro-cavity PUFs are extremely small, inexpensive, robust, and fully 
compatible with telecommunications infrastructure, components, and electronic fabrication. 
This approach can serve one-time pad or public key exchange applications where high 
security is required. 
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1. Introduction 
Maintaining confidentiality while communicating in the presence of adversaries forms the 
foundation of cryptology [1]. While modern ciphers attempt to provide such guarantees, the 
one-time pad (OTP) protocol provides an information-theoretic secure approach even against 
computationally unbounded adversaries [2]. In practice, the price of such security is storing 
large digital keys in nonvolatile memory, thus increasing the risk of compromise through 
duplication of this presumed private information. Additionally, modern systems convey such 
increasingly vast volumes of data that the storage of suitably long keys is an immense 
challenge. 
Promising recent work on the storage of long OTP keys [3] based on spatial optical 
scattering within a complex material [4–6] addresses many of the weaknesses of electronic 
storage, as such devices are difficult to probe, modify, or clone. Such optical scattering PUFs 
(OSPUFs) [7] provide an intriguing alternative to digital storage of private key information. 
However, OSPUFs are large and difficult to integrate into electronic circuits [6]. Further, 
mechanical positioning variability introduces inter-key noise that has not been fully mitigated 
by error correction coding, resulting in a system bit error rate (BER) of    at a highly 
inefficient code rate of only 0.035 [3,5]. 
Here we demonstrate an information-theoretically secure symmetric block cipher based on 
the fuzzy extraction of key material from information-dense ultrafast nonlinear optical 
interactions in silicon photonic micro-cavities [8,9] [Fig. 1(a)]. The photonic micro-cavities 
are operated in a nonlinear optical regime and designed as a disk with a chamfer, which 
exhibits reverberant ray-chaotic behavior [10]. In our previous work [10], we examined the 
device’s Lyapunov exponent, phase space, and escape rate which indicated that the devices 
operate in a chaotic state. Thus, the cavity’s ultrafast optical output waveforms are complex 
and highly sensitive to the precise physical cavity structure. This high behavioral sensitivity 
to precise structure prevents an adversary from cloning a micro-cavity. Still, despite this 
sensitivity, the responses from a given cavity are deterministic and highly repeatable. This 
combination of robustness and unclonability allows these micro-cavities to serve as a robust 
PUF [9]. Here we demonstrate the ability to extract long binary keys (2.4 Gb) from a single 
micro-cavity PUF that can subsequently be used to encrypt a communications channel. 
Furthermore, in an encrypted communications scenario employing unique pairs of PUFs we 
demonstrate a BER of  at a code rate of 0.1. Notably, at this code rate, our attempts at 
cloning the PUFs results in a probability of correct message decryption of only . 
2. System Design 
Device Fabrication and Information Extraction 
To investigate this approach, we fabricated six unique silicon photonic micro-cavity PUF 
designs (variations on a 30-µm diameter silicon disk with a chamfer) and two exact copies 
(clones) of each PUF using electron beam lithography and standard nanofabrication 
techniques [Fig. 1(a)].  
 
Fig. 1. Operation of the photonic PUF. (a) A spectro-temporally encoded ultrafast optical pulse 
sequence is sent into the photonic PUF. The response sequence generated by the cavity is 
passed through a programmable spectral filter and is then detected. A series of digital signal 
processing steps are performed before sending the binary response to a fuzzy extractor to 
generate a binary key. Scanning electron microscope (SEM) images of the six prototype 
designs are shown. (b) Larger SEM image of an example prototype device. (c) A finite 
difference time domain (FDTD) image detailing the excitation of many transient optical modes 
within the cavity after ultrafast excitation. 
These devices are fabricated from single-crystal silicon-on-insulator (SOI) material (220-
nm thick) clad with 1 µm of silicon dioxide, achieving a device volume of approximately 160 
µm3. Each design differs from the others in a single parameter including existence, size, and 
position of the chamfer, as well as the presence of arbitrarily positioned holes within the 
cavity. In addition, two copies of every cavity are fabricated on the same SOI die and in the 
same fabrication run, permitting analysis of PUF clonability. All clones use an identical 
design and are fabricated at the same time and in close proximity to the legitimate devices to 
maximize the chance of successful cloning. The precise fabrication process is detailed in [9]. 
Design 1 is 30-µm in diameter and has a 0.8r sized chamfer (0.8 times its radius) centered at 
0 degrees on the unit circle; design 2 is 26-µm in diameter and has a 0.8r sized chamfer at 0 
degrees; design 3 is 30-µm in diameter and has a 0.7r sized chamfer at 0 degrees; design 4 is 
30-µm in diameter and has a 0.8r sized chamfer at -45 degrees; and both design 5 and 6 are 
30-µm in diameter with 0.8r sized chamfers at 0 degrees, each with a different hole pattern. 
Due to damage from device handling, we were able to test four devices each of designs 1-4, 
three design 5 devices, and two design 6 devices, yielding 21 experimental devices in total. 
All designs employ single-mode silicon waveguide ports for robust input and output coupling 
to the cavity. 
To extract a binary key from a photonic micro-cavity PUF, we probe it with a rapid 
sequence of spectrally amplitude encoded, [11] ultrashort optical pulses [Fig. 1(a)] exciting a 
unique combination of spatial optical modes that interact with the fine-scale structure of the 
cavity interior and with one another via the optical nonlinearity of silicon [11,12]. This 
produces a sequence of ultrafast optical responses, each of which ideally contains 
independent, information-carrying spectro-temporal features that are sensitive to the cavity 
structure. To extract information from these responses, we pass each response through a 
spectral amplitude mask and measure the transmitted pulse energy with a lower bandwidth 
photodiode. A binary response sequence is then computed from the measured analog pulse 
energy sequence using a post-processing algorithm (see the following section).  
Experimental Setup 
 
Fig. 2. Silicon photonic PUF experimental setup. A 90 MHz mode-locked laser (MLL) 
generated ultrashort pulses, i.e. < 300 fs full-width half max (FWHM). These are amplified via 
an erbium doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) and sent through dispersion compensating fiber 
(DCF) to spread the pulse to about 11 ns. The pulses are sent through a polarization controller 
(PC) and then through a Mach Zehnder modulator (MZM) to encode a pseudo-random binary 
sequence onto each pulse in real time. This is performed by taking the synchronized monitor 
port of the MLL and first detecting each pulse with a photo-diode (PD). The signal is passed 
through a low pass filter and then used as a clock signal for the pulse pattern generator (PPG) 
which is connected to the MZM. The spectrally-modulated pulses are sent through anomalous 
DCF to compress them back to < 3ps. The pulse train is sent through another PC, EDFA, and a 
programmable spectral filter or WaveShaper (WS) (for additional dispersion compensation) 
prior to insertion into a tapered fiber at the chip edge aligned to a tapered waveguide (TWG) 
for fiber-to-waveguide coupling. The pulses excite many modes within the cavity and each 
optical response is collected via a focusing lens and collimator (COL) to couple back into a 
single mode fiber (SMF). A polarizer (POL) is used on the output to select a polarization state 
under test. The output pulses are amplified for detection by an EDFA and sent through a WS to 
pass each pulse through a 296-feature spectral pattern over the spectral bandwidth of each 
pulse. The pulses are detected using a PD and read via an oscilloscope for further post-
processing to convert into the final binary key material.  
The native 300-fs duration pulses from the mode-locked laser are used with a novel ultrafast 
pulse shaper that spectrally encodes the amplitude of each individual pulse as follows: [18] 
dispersion compensating fiber (DCF) stretches the 300-fs mode-locked laser (MLL) pulse to 
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greater than 11 ns. The temporally dispersed spectrum is spectrally amplitude encoded by a 
length 128 pseudorandom binary sequence (PRBS) at 11.52 Gbit/s that is synchronized to the 
MLL. There is some overlap between time stretched pulses at this stage and thus neighboring 
pulses share some temporal features. However, they are mapped to different wavelengths and 
thus involve different parts of the pattern, i.e. do not spectrally overlap. This allows the 
patterns on each pulse to remain incoherent while providing more features on each pulse. We 
achieve 94 features within the 3-dB bandwidth of each pulse.  
After spectral patterning, the pulses are compressed using D2=+247 ps/nm fiber to 6 ps. 
These pulses are amplified with an EDFA (Amonics C-band Erbium Doped Fiber Amplifier 
AEDFA-PA-35, 150mW) to an average power of 64 mW and coupled into the chip as before. 
The output pulses are then sent to another EDFA (Amonics C-band Erbium Doped Fiber 
Amplifier AEDFA-PA-30, 20 mW) to pre-amplify for detection. The amplified pulse is sent 
through a spectral filter (WaveShaper 1000s, C-Band), which applies 296 amplitude features 
to the pulse. The input pulse bandwidth (1535-1575 nm) was not perfectly aligned with the 
spectral filter used in the experiment (1527.4-1567.5 nm), thus some of the spectrally-
encoded information was lost. The filtered pulse was sent to a photo-diode and detected with 
an ADC convertor (Prologic Designs ADC16100LAN with the ability to store over four 
million samples) and was synchronized to the MLL.  
Post-Processing Algorithm 
The measured power level from the system is transformed into a binary sequence though an 
algorithm that enhances its indistinguishability from a true random binary sequence. In the 
oscilloscope detection configuration, the original measurements are interpolated to enhance 
the available points between peak power samples. The algorithm then finds the peaks of the 
resultant power signals that correspond to individual challenge pulses facilitated by use of a 
repeating header sequence. To enhance the SNR of the sampled signals, an optimization 
routine is run on the sampled data to determine an ideal integration window. Once 
determined, a window centered at the peak centroid for each response is integrated to produce 
an integrated power measurement. In the Prologic ADC detection configuration, this step is 
not required as there is only a single synchronized point per detected pulse. A probability 
density function (PDF) is calculated for the challenge set. A histogram equalization algorithm 
is used to calculate non-uniform levels that will make any subsequently collected responses 
equi-probable when converted to binary. The power samples are then digitized and converted 
to binary against the non-uniform levels (resampling). An XOR operation is performed on 
adjacent sequences [19] and a number of MSBs are kept from each sample and appended 
together to create a single bit sequence representative of the challenge set. The resampling 
bits and the number of kept MSBs are optimized to minimize error. 
Security Requirements 
In order to exploit this scheme for secure communications, we first define the associated 
security requirements. The unconditional security for a OTP protocol is guaranteed only if the 
message is mixed with a random key and never reused [13]. We assume that the output of a 
cryptographic hash function is sufficient for use as statistically random key material [14] and 
that the reuse requirement may be met with proper protocol design and execution. The 
security of this approach does not depend on the security of any electronically stored data as 
all such data can be made public without loss of security. The primary requirement is that the 
adversary must not be able to efficiently copy or model the operation of the PUF [3]. Our 
previous work has demonstrated the unclonability of our photonic micro-cavity PUFs [9], 
which we verify for the system conditions here and it thereby satisfies this requirement. 
Further, entropic security, i.e. with an observation of some ciphertext, an adversary will not 
be able to compute any predicate on the ciphertext with meaningfully larger probability than 
an adversary who does not possess the ciphertext [15,16], is guaranteed only if the target data 
has high entropy [17].  
  
3. Detector Performance and Key Material Quality 
For use of these silicon photonic PUFs in a OTP encrypted communications system it is 
critical that a large amount of key material can be extracted from a single device. To 
investigate the extraction of long binary keys we probe a single PUF device with a sequence 
of 2×107 uniquely patterned pulses and apply 31 orthogonal Hadamard spectral filter patterns 
to the output, thus generating 6.2×108 analog pulse energy samples, which we convert to 
binary keys through the methods described as follows.  
Robustness and Repeatability Analysis 
A robustness and repeatability analysis was performed on the experimental designs. A 
common set of 8550 pseudo-randomly generated patterns of 128 bits were used for the pattern 
set. The Prologic Designs ADC16100LAN, Analog-Digital Converter has the ability to 
collect over 4 million samples with one sample for each input pattern yielding enough 
memory for 468 repetitions. All of the experimental data went through the post-processing 
algorithm to represent the 8550 patterns as a single bit sequence. Inter and intra-parameter 
FHD were calculated for every possible combination of bit sequences. For each distribution, 
the mean and standard deviation were also calculated. These values were used to calculate the 
effective number of independent bits via N=p(1-p)/σ, where p is the experimental mean and σ 
is the experimental standard deviation [4]. These results were used to fit a binomial 
distribution to the different configuration parameter sets and consequently calculate 
probabilities of error correction on the response from an illegitimate device from the 
corresponding cumulative binomial distributions. 
Entropy and Compressibility 
To assess the quality of this key material we analyze its entropy and compressibility. First we 
quantify the number of bits that can be accurately extracted from each analog sample by 
measuring the effective number of bits (ENOB) resulting from the signal to noise ratio of the 
samples [Fig. 3(a)] and find the mean to be 9.64 bits. We then compute the mean entropy rate 
of the raw analog samples as a function of the number of sampling bits [Fig. 3(b)] by 
measuring the probability density function (PDF) at each sampling level. At a sampling value 
of 10 bits to approximate the ENOB [Fig. 3(c)], we find that the entropy rate is 9 bits, 
indicating the maximum rate of entropy per sample. However, for key generation it is 
desirable that each level is equiprobable. Thus, we resample using a nonuniform level spacing 
and analysis of this operation indicates that 4 or fewer of each sample’s most significant bits 
(MSBs) are sufficiently repeatable for key generation [Fig. 3(d)], resulting in approximately 
2.4 Gb of key material. 
In order to estimate a lower bound on the binary response entropy, we apply an open-
source context tree weighting (CTW) compression scheme [20,21], operating with its default 
parameters and a tree-depth of 6 to 24 blocks of 100 Mb of key material as demonstrated 
in [3]. The sample key material is seen to be incompressible [Fig. 3(e)], suggesting a per-bit 
entropy of exactly one. Thus the silicon photonic PUF device has an information capacity of 
at least 2.4 Gb. Notably, given the device’s size this results in an information density of 2.3 
Pb/in2 which is several orders of magnitude beyond industrial memory storage methods, i.e. 
compact disks (0.9 Gb/in2), digital video discs (2.2 Gb/in2), hard disk drives (1 Tb/in2), and 
solid-state memory (2.8 Tb/in2) [22–24]. 
 
 Fig. 3. PUF output evaluation. (a) Effective number of bits (ENOB) for each detection channel 
formed from a set of order-32 Hadamard orthogonal spectral patterns applied to 20×106 PUF 
responses prior to detection. (b) Mean entropy rate across all channels at different resampling 
levels in post-processing. (c) Probability density function (PDF) of the detected signal across 
all channels and responses for a resampling to 10 bits in post-processing. (d) Mean error by bit 
location (big endian) in terms of fractional Hamming distance (FHD) between binary 
responses generated from successive repetitions of the same challenge to the system. (e) 
Compression rate of processed binary responses via the CTW algorithm for 24 blocks of 100 
Mbits samples of key material. The observed mean compression rate (1.0061) indicates the 
incompressibility of the PUF responses prior to fuzzy extraction. 
4. Secure Communications Protocol 
Next we investigate the secure communications performance of silicon photonic PUFs by 
implementing an encrypted OTP communication channel between two parties [13], Alice and 
Bob, each of whom possesses a distinct photonic PUF [Fig. 4]. In order to communicate, they 
synchronize their photonic PUFs to generate a shared key by first meeting physically or over 
a known secure channel. This process also generates public helper data that aids in key 
recovery and negligibly reduces the security of the system. To send a message, Alice 
reconstructs her private key, encrypts a message of equal length, and sends the ciphertext over 
a public communication channel. Bob reconstructs his private key and performs an exclusive-
or (XOR) operation with a previously generated shared key to recover Alice’s private key 
with which he recovers Alice’s message. Alice and Bob would communicate until their key 
space is exhausted at which time they generate more shared key material. This 
communications protocol can be enhanced by requiring authentication [8,9] to access the 
public dictionary to mitigate denial of service attacks. 
(a) (b)
(c)
(d) (e)
µ = 9.64 bits
~ENOB
 Fig. 4. (a) Encrypted communication protocol. Two endpoints, A and B, have unique photonic 
PUFs. A fuzzy extractor is applied to the response sequence derived from PUF A to recover a 
specific block of key material with the help from data in a public dictionary. A message is 
encrypted via digital exclusive-or (XOR) with that key and is sent through a public channel. 
Endpoint B recovers their unique key in the same manner as A. The key from A is recovered 
by B via digital XOR with a previously constructed shared key. This recovered key from A is 
used to recover the message from the ciphertext via digital XOR. (b) Generation procedure. A 
challenge p interrogates the PUF resulting in a binary response w, which is sent into the secure 
sketch (SS) and extractor. The SS takes w and a random value r to generate helper data s. The 
extractor ingests w and a random value x to produce key R. Both s and x are stored in a public 
dictionary as helper data. (c) Reconstruction procedure. Challenge p interrogates the PUF 
which produces w′ which may be different than w given noise. The reconstructor takes helper 
data s and response w′ to reconstruct w which the extractor uses, with helper data x, to 
reproduce key R. 
This scheme comprises three building blocks [Fig. 4(b) & (c)]. An extractor withdraws 
information of uniform randomness from the photonic PUF response [17]. The secure sketch 
creates public information from its input that does not provide an adversary a significant 
advantage [17] and that allows the reconstructor to fully reconstruct the original input [25] 
from one that is reasonably close to the original. The cipher is applied to blocks of PUF key 
material. If the PUF response is not reconstructed to a predetermined error threshold, no 
portion of the message in that block is recovered. A fuzzy extractor is used in the dictionary 
setup to generate keys for public storage and in the communications protocol to recover the 
original key from a noisy key. 
Fuzzy Extraction Algorithm 
During the dictionary setup procedure [Fig. 5(a)], several repetitions of the response sequence 
from PUFA of a single input pattern, pi, are averaged together prior to binary post-processing 
to form an averaged PUF response 〈wi〉 corresponding to the ith block, e.g. 〈wi〉 = 〈PUFA(pi)〉. 
Within the secure sketch, a random word, ki, is selected for each block to generate ri = 
BCHenc(ki) [26]and combined with the averaged PUF response via XOR to generate the helper 
data si, e.g. si = 〈wi〉 ⊕ ri = 〈PUFA(pi)〉 ⊕ BCHenc(ki). Within the fuzzy extractor, the averaged 
PUF response is combined with a randomly generated seed, xi, via XOR and then input into 
the SHA-256 hash function to generate 〈Ri〉 = SHA(〈wi〉 ⊕ xi) = SHA(〈PUFA(pi)〉 ⊕ xi). The 
random seed is stored as helper data in the public dictionary. Likewise, the same process 
follows for the second PUF such that 〈Rj〉 = SHA(〈wj〉 ⊕ xj) with sj and xj being stored as 
helper data in the public dictionary where such data is stored by the jth block corresponding to 
PUFB. In addition to the helper data, the input patterns, pi and pj, are also stored in the 
dictionary. Lastly, a shared key corresponding to both PUFs is calculated by combining 〈Ri〉 
and 〈Rj〉 via XOR, e.g. kij = 〈Ri〉 ⊕ 〈Rj〉, and storing in the public dictionary.  
 
 Fig. 5. Fuzzy Extraction Dictionary Setup and Communications Protocol. (a) Dictionary Setup. 
(b) Communications Protocol. 
In order to encrypt a message [Fig. 5(b)], Alice will recover her key by first querying her 
token and recording a single shot response from her PUF, e.g. wi = PUFA(pi), then combining 
the response with the helper data, si, to recover some corrupted ri′ = wi ⊕ si from which ki is 
perfectly recovered via BCH decoding, so long as ei = wi ⊕ <wi> ≤ (dmin – 1)/2 where 	
  is 
the minimum distance of the BCH code. ki is encoded with the same BCH code to fully 
recover ri from ri′. The errors in the PUF response are corrected and the averaged response is 
recovered by combining si and ri via XOR to achieve 〈wi〉  = si ⊕ ri. If the Hamming distance 
between wi and 〈wi〉 is greater than (dmin – 1)/2, then either a different BCH codeword 
altogether will result (called “decoder error”), or the BCH decoder will be unable to output a 
binary word at all (“decoder failure”). The recovered response is XORed with the stored 
random seed  and hashed to form Rí′ = SHA(wi′ ⊕ xi). Any differences between wi′ and 〈wi〉 
will be amplified via the hash function as the hashes will be uncorrelated [14]. Lastly, the 
message, m, is combined via XOR with Ri′ to form the ciphertext, c = m ⊕ Ri′. 
In order to decrypt the ciphertext, Bob follows the same recovery process as Alice to 
recover his key, Rj′ = SHA(wj′ ⊕ xj). Bob then combines via XOR his recovered key, Rj′, with 
the shared key, kij, to recover a variant of Alice’s key, e.g. Ri′′ = kij  ⊕ Rj′ = 〈Ri〉 ⊕ 〈Rj〉  ⊕ Rj′. 
Bob then combines Alice’s recovered key via XOR with the ciphertext to recover the 
message, e.g. m′ = c ⊕ Ri′′ = m ⊕ Ri′ ⊕ 〈Ri〉 ⊕ 〈Rj〉 ⊕ Rj′. Variations in laser and modulator 
outputs, power loss, vibration, and detector noise contribute to overall system noise which 
unavoidably corrupts the PUF response, causing the same patterned pulse to produce varying 
responses. As such, the probability of an error in the recovered message is based on the 
probability that each PUF response will deviate from the expected response beyond the error 
correction capability of the error correction code (ECC). The message is recovered without 
error, m′ = m, if and only if wi ≅ 〈wi〉 and wj ≅ 〈wj〉, i.e. if ei and ej are correctable by the BCH 
code used. 
The probability of an error in the perfect recovery of the hashes for PUFA is PrA(e) = 
Pr(Ri′ ≠ 〈Ri〉). This is equivalent to the probability that a PUF response has more errors with 
respect to the averaged PUF response than the error correction threshold, e.g. PrA(e) = 
Pr(FHD(wi′,〈wi〉) ≥ α), where α is the threshold at which BCH can correct all of the errors in 
the response. This probability is equal to the complementary cumulative binomial probability 
distribution evaluated at that threshold. Likewise, for PUFB, the probability of an error is 
PrB(e) = Pr(FHD(wj′,〈wj〉) ≥ α). Therefore, the overall probability that a block of data is 
corrupted is the likelihood that either of the PUF responses are not fully recovered, e.g. Pr(m′ 
≠ m) = 1 – [(1 – PrA(e)) × (1 – PrB(e))].  
Experimental Results 
To quantify the robustness of this approach, we interrogate all of the photonic PUFs with an 
identical sequence of 8550 uniquely patterned ultrafast optical pulses. The optical response 
sequence from each cavity is passed through a pseudorandom spectral mask with 296 features 
across the optical bandwidth and the transmitted analog pulse energy sequence is recorded 
using a photodetector and ADC and converted into a binary key as before. In this case, we 
save the three MSBs of the key material derived from each pulse, which are concatenated to 
form a 25,650-bit binary response for each device. The binary response is decomposed into 
100 blocks of 255 bits and inserted into a fuzzy extractor, which produces helper data and a 
binary hash sequence to generate suitable keys for secure communications. To best represent 
a real-world implementation, the measured analog pulse energy sequence from 460 
repetitions is averaged together prior to binary conversion for generation of the shared key, 
whereas for message encryption a single-shot (not averaged) sequence is employed. Thus for 
encryption the key material is extracted from the PUF at 0.27 Gbps. 
 
Fig. 6. Normalized FHD binomial distributions and histograms for binary responses from 
same, different, and cloned designs, resampling to 3 bits post-analog-to-digital conversion 
(ADC) at a block size of 256 bits. All responses were generated from the quasi-Transverse 
Electric (TE) polarization state. 
To analyze the uniqueness and repeatability of the generated binary keys the fraction of 
positions in which the binary sequences differ (the “fractional Hamming distance” or FHD) is 
calculated between each individually generated key and the averaged keys used to generate 
the dictionary for all 22 devices. The histogram of FHDs between each individual binary key 
from each device and the averaged binary key from that same device forms the “same” 
distribution [Fig. 6]. The histogram of FHDs between each individual binary key from each 
device and the averaged binary key from each different device forms the “different” 
distribution. Likewise, the histogram of FHDs between each individual binary key from each 
device and the averaged binary key from each respective cloned device forms the “clone” 
distribution. The clear separation of these histograms demonstrates the distinguishability of 
binary keys from different devices including exact clones and the small FHD of the “same” 
distribution demonstrates the robustness of extracting the binary key material at high speed 
from the physical device. A binomial probability mass function is fit to each histogram and is 
used to estimate the probability that a given PUF response will be beyond the error correction 
capabilities of the error correcting code (ECC) at a selected code rate, thus corrupting an 
entire block of data. The probability that a device of different design or its clone [9] could 
respond within the correctable range of the code is negligible across all possible code rates 
indicating strong unclonability. 
 
Fig. 7. The mean experimental and predicted BER are shown for 57 combinations of different 
devices communicating a test image of 25,575 bits at various BCH code rates. The upper and 
lower bars indicate a two standard deviation bound relative to the mean BER. Lower bounds 
for low code rates are not shown due to perfect message reconstruction. The inset images show 
the recovered message (university seal) at various code rates. The mean experimental BER vs 
code rate for an adversary attempting to decrypt a message using the intended endpoint’s clone 
are shown for the same 57 combinations, demonstrating unclonability. The lowest observed 
clone BER is 0.483. 
To characterize the system BER, 57 different pairs of unique photonic PUFs were used to 
communicate a message of 25,575 bits. The BER at different BCH code rates is shown in Fig. 
7. Communication with a mean BER < 10-5 is observed at code rates of < 0.1. Notably, at 
equivalent code rates (0.035) to previous approaches [3], we achieve an eight order of 
magnitude improvement in BER.  
5. Security Analysis 
One approach to eavesdrop or maliciously send messages is for an adversary to obtain the 
cavity design and attempt to fabricate a clone of the device. However, the ray chaotic cavity 
design makes a device’s behavior highly sensitive to structural variations arising from the 
fabrication process such as sidewall roughness, film thickness, resist granularity, and material 
impurities. To directly investigate this attack, we fabricated two such clones of each device in 
close proximity on the same chip, thus maximizing consistency of fabrication conditions 
across devices, and compared the keys generated by legitimate and cloned devices. The BER 
using cloned devices is shown in Fig. 7. Notably, at a code rate of 0.1 where we achieve error 
free communication of our 25,575-bit message with a legitimate device, the probability of a 
successful decryption with a cloned device is on the order of 10-11, demonstrating the near 
impossibility of using a cloned device to eavesdrop or maliciously communicate.  
Beyond cloning, an adversary could capture a device and attempt to fully characterize it. 
However, the nonlinearity of our devices protects against such an attack by greatly increasing 
the amount of information that an attacker would need to characterize [9]. Specifically, in a 
linear system, the mapping from the system input to its output may be represented as a linear 
combination of its input symbols in the form of a transmission matrix whose uniqueness is 
limited by the number of orthogonal input vectors. If an adversary can observe and 
characterize this transmission matrix, and compute its inverse or pseudoinverse, they can 
obtain, exactly or approximately, any input given the output and vice-versa. In contrast, in a 
nonlinear system, the transmission function is a system of nonlinear relationships for which 
no such inversion exists. As the PUFs investigated here are nonlinear devices, this 
characterization would potentially require probing of up to 2128 different challenges and 
recording the subsequent responses. With our 90-MHz repetition rate laser source, that 
characterization would take up to 1023 years and would push the adversary towards other 
attacks. For example, the adversary could use the input pattern data stored in the public 
dictionary to reduce their search space. Provided the transport time is carefully monitored, a 
suitable number of patterns occupy the public dictionary, and patterns are chosen at random, 
this attack is sufficiently mitigated. Further, if access to the public dictionary is protected 
using a PUF authentication approach [9] or equivalent public key architecture, then the 
adversary will have no advantage. Should the adversary record the encrypted communications 
channel and steal a device at a later date, they could attempt to decrypt previously sent 
messages. Protocol level enhancements applying ephemeral session keys could mitigate this 
attack. 
While we used the BCH code and the SHA-256 hash in this demonstration, any suitable 
code and hash can be used. An adversary wishing to reverse the hash function would need to 
do so for each block; we assume this is sufficiently difficult [27,28] for the adversary to avoid 
this attack altogether. In order to verify the independence of generated keys, we calculate the 
entropy of 1000 privacy amplified keys as (µ∗(1-µ))/σ2, where µ is the mean and σ is the 
standard deviation of the FHD distribution yielding 256.1 bits [4]. Based on this evaluation, 
the output strings of the fuzzy extractor contain full entropy [29], as their length is 256 bits. 
Thus, the probability of guessing the true PUF response from the privacy amplified key 
would be 2-256, i.e., an information theoretic security of 256 bits. 
6. Summary, Discussion, and Future Work 
In conclusion, we demonstrate encrypted communications using key information extracted 
from information-dense nonlinear silicon photonic PUFs. Compared to previous work on 
optical scattering based PUFs [3], this novel photonic PUF provides orders of magnitude 
improvement on channel BER and reductions in physical size while providing full 
compatibility with integrated circuits and telecommunications systems. The device also 
provides information densities far beyond current storage media. Given the growth of the size 
of the public dictionary, this method may find best application to the exchange of secure keys 
for modern cryptographic ciphers. We expect that the approach can scale to support the 
demands of high-speed transmission through use of higher repetition rate and bandwidth laser 
sources, spectro-temporal multi-level amplitude and phase encoding, as well as temporal 
multiplexing to enhance key generation rates. 
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